Abstract. In 1994 Herbelin started and partially achieved the programme of showing that, for intuitionistic implicational logic, there is a Curry-Howard interpretation of sequent calculus into a variant of the λ-calculus, specifically a variant which manipulates formally "applicative contexts" and inverts the associativity of "applicative terms". Herbelin worked with a fragment of sequent calculus with constraints on left introduction. In this paper we complete Herbelin's programme for full sequent calculus, that is, sequent calculus without the mentioned constraints, but where permutative conversions necessarily show up. This requires the introduction of a lambda-like calculus for full sequent calculus and an extension of natural deduction that gives meaning to "applicative contexts" and "applicative terms". Such extension is a calculus with modus ponens and primitive substitution that refines von Plato's natural deduction; it is also a "coercion calculus", in the sense of Cervesato and Pfenning. The proof-theoretical outcome is noteworthy: the puzzling relationship between cut and substitution is settled; and cut-elimination in sequent calculus is proven isomorphic to normalisation in the proposed natural deduction system. The isomorphism is the mapping that inverts the associativity of applicative terms.
Introduction
Herbelin's CSL'94 paper [11] is an integrated contribution into two closely related subjects: structural proof theory and the study of the computational interpretation of sequent calculus. Here, structural proof theory is taken in the restricted sense of the study of the relationship between natural deduction and sequent calculus, the two kinds of proof systems introduced since the subject was born [10] . Such relationship is a puzzle that constantly attracted attention during the last 70 years [10, 18, 22, 17, 14, 20] . The study of the computational interpretation of sequent calculus, with the purpose of extending the Curry-Howard correspondence, is a relatively recent topic, with the first explicit contributions starting in the early 1990's [9, 21, 13 ]. An integrated contribution to the two subjects is desirable: one should understand the differences and similarities between natural deduction and sequent calculus, if one wants to extend the Curry-Howard correspondence; and a way of expressing those differences and similarities is, precisely, via the corresponding computational interpretations.
Herbelin's paper initiates the programme of defining a λ-calculus (with a strongly normalising set of reduction rules) such that, by means of the calculus, the following two goals are achieved simultaneously: (1) to give a convincing computational interpretation of (a fragment of) sequent calculus, along the lines of the Curry-Howard correspondence; and (2) to express the difference between sequent calculus and natural deduction, reducing it to the mere inversion of the associativity of applicative terms.
Herbelin studied a fragment LJT of sequent calculus LJ and gave its computational interpretation in terms of the so-called λ-calculus. Contrary to earlier contributions, whose focus was on the feature of pattern matching, in λ the novelty is the existence of an auxiliary syntactic class of applicative contexts. In the case of intuitionistic implication, an applicative context is simply a list of terms, understood as a "multiary" argument for functional application. Hence, "applicative terms" in λ have the form t[u 1 , ..., u m ]. Herbelin concludes that the difference between sequent calculus and natural deduction resides in the organization of applicative terms: sequent calculus is right-associative t(u 1 :: ... Herbelin's paper achieved (1) for LJT and has the merit of suggesting that (2) can be achieved. Verification of (2) happened in later papers. The mapping that inverts the associativity of applicative terms is proved in [3] to be a bijection between normal λ-terms and cut-free λ-terms, in [5] to be an isomorphism between the λ-calculus and a fragment of λ, and in [6] to be an isomorphism between an extension of the λ-calculus and a larger fragment of λ. Fulfillment of (2) is useful for (1), because only an isomorphic natural deduction system gives rigorous meaning to "applicative context" and "applicative term".
Notwithstanding the parts of Herbelin's programme already completed (including the extension of (1) to classical logic in [2] ), a lot remains unfinished. LJT is a permutation-free fragment, where only a restricted form of left introduction is available and where the computational meaning of permutation (so typical of sequent calculus) is absent. In addition, the fulfilment of (2), in connection with larger fragments of sequent calculus, requires the extension of the natural deduction system. One idea for this extension is in [6] , and turns out to be the idea of defining natural deduction as a "coercion calculus", in the sense of Cervesato and Pfenning [1] . Another idea is that of generalised elimination rules, due to von Plato [20] .
In the setting of intuitionistic implicational logic, we contribute to the completion of Herbelin's programme for full sequent calculus, that is, sequent calculus without constraints on left introductions (but where permutative conversions necessarily show up). The computational interpretation is in terms of a λ-calculus λ Gtz with a primitive notion of applicative context, taken in a natural, generalised sense. In order to fulfil (2), a system of natural deduction λ Nat is defined that extends and refines von Plato's natural deduction. It is a calculus with modus ponens and primitive substitution and it is also a coercion calculus. Then we prove that λ Gtz ∼ = λ Nat in the fullest sense: the mapping that inverts the associativity of applicative terms is a sound bijection between the sets of terms of the two calculi and, in addition, establishes an isomorphism between cut-elimination in λ Gtz and normalisation in λ Nat . Strong cut-elimination for λ Gtz is proved via an interpretation into the calculus of "delayed substitutions" λs of [7] ; strong normalisation for λ Nat follows by isomorphism. These results constitute, for the logic under analysis here, considerable improvements over [11, 1, 20, 6] .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents λ Gtz . Section 3 presents λ Nat . Sections 4 and 5 prove and analyze λ Gtz ∼ = λ Nat . Section 6 concludes. Notations: Types (=formulas) are ranged over by A, B, C and generated from type variables using the "arrow type" (=implication), written A ⊃ B. Contexts Γ are consistent sets of declarations x : A. "Consistent" means that for each variable x there is at most one declaration in Γ . The notation Γ, x : A always produces a consistent set. Meta-substitution is denoted with square brackets [ /x] . All calculi in this paper assume Barendregt's variable convention (in particular we take renaming of bound variables for granted).
Naming of systems: sequent calculi are denoted λ S (where S is some tag); natural deduction systems introduced here are denoted λ S ; more or less traditional systems of natural deduction are denoted λS.
Sequent calculus
The sequent calculus we introduce is named λ Gtz (read "λ-Gentzen"). Expressions and typing rules: There are two sorts of expressions in λ Gtz : terms t, u, v and contexts k. The typing rules of λ Gtz are as follows:
There are two sorts of sequents in λ Gtz , namely Γ ⊢ t : A and Γ ; A ⊢ k : B. The distinguished position in the antecedent of sequents of the latter kind contains the selected formula. There is a typing rule Selection that selects an antecedent formula. Besides this rule, there are the axiom rule, the introductions on the left(=antecedent) and on the right(=succedent) of sequents, and the cut.
The typing rules follow a reasonable discipline: active formulas in the antecedent of sequents have to be previously selected (the B in Lef t and one A in Cut); and a formula introduced on the left is selected. The latter constraint implies that a left introduction u :: k is a linear introduction, because there cannot be an implicit contraction. Full left introduction is recovered as a cut between an axiom and a linear left introduction, corresponding to x(u :: k). The cut-elimination process will not touch these trivial cuts. More generally, given a context k, xk represents the inverse of a selection, that is, the operation that takes a formula out of the selection position and gives it name x. An implicit contraction may happen here.
Reduction rules: The reduction rules of λ Gtz are as follows:
By cut-elimination we mean βπσ-reduction. Rules β, π and σ aim at eliminating all cuts that are not of the form x(u :: k). The procedure is standard. If a cut is a key-cut (both cut-formulas main(=introduced) in the premisses) with cutformula A ⊃ B, the cut is reduced to two cuts, with cut-formulas A and B. This is rule β. If a cut, not of the form x(u :: k), is not a key cut, this means that it can be permuted to the right (rule σ) or to the left (rule π). The particular case of σ when v = x is named ǫ and reads t/x x → t or t[] → t. A term t is a βπσ-normal form iff it is generated by the following grammar:
There is a further reduction rule, named µ, of a different nature. It undoes the sequence of inferences consisting of un-selecting and selecting the same formula, if no implicit contraction is involved. A similar rule has been defined for Parigot's λµ-calculus [16] , but acting on the RHS of sequents.
Consider the term (λx.t)(u :: k). After a β-step,
is both a σ-and a π-redex. In this case, there is a choice as to how to continue evaluation. Opting for σ gives ([u/x]t)k, whereas the π option gives t ′ (k ′ @(x)tk). According to [2] , this choice is a choice between a call-by-name and a call-by-value strategy of evaluation.
Strong normalisation: We give a proof of strong normalisation for λ Gtz by defining a reduction-preserving interpretation in the λs-calculus of [7] .
The terms of λs are given by:
This set of terms is equipped with the following reduction rules:
where meta-substitution [N/x]M is defined as expected. In particular
We now define a mapping ( ) * : λ Gtz → λs. More precisely, mappings ( ) * : λ Gtz − T erms → λs − T erms and ( , ) * : λs − T erms × λ Gtz − Contexts → λs − T erms are defined by simultaneous recursion as follows:
The idea is that, if t, u i and v are mapped by ( ) * to M , N i and P , respectively, then t(u 1 ::
Proof: Follows from the following four facts:
Theorem 1 (Strong cut-elim.). Every typable t ∈ λ Gtz is βπσµ-SN.
Proof: [7] proves that every typable t ∈ λs is βπσ-SN (if we use for λs the obvious typing rules). The theorem follows from this fact, the previous proposition and the fact that ( ) * preserves typability.
Related systems:
We can easily embed LJ in λ Gtz , if we define LJ as the typing system for some obvious term language. The embedding is given by:
The cut-free LJ terms correspond to the sub-class of terms in (1) such that k in x(u :: k) has to be a selection (y)v. These correspond also to von Plato's "fully normal " natural deductions. βπσ-normal forms correspond exactly to Schwichtenberg's multiary cut-free terms [19] . We refer to these as Schwichtenberg nfs. A context u 1 :: ... :: u m :: (x)x (m ≥ 0) is called an applicative context, and may be regarded as a list [u 1 , ..., u m ], if we think of (x)x as []. If every context in a term t is applicative, t is a λ-term. A term t is βπσ-normal and only contains applicative contexts iff t is a cut-free λ-term, in the sense of [11] . We refer to such terms as Herbelin nfs. They are given by t, u ::= x | λx.t | x(u :: k) and k ::= [] | u :: k. Another characterisation of this set is as the set of Schwichtenberg's terms (1) normal w.r.t. certain permutative conversions [19] .
Every cut in λ Gtz is of the form t(u 1 :: ... :: u m :: (x)v), with m ≥ 0. Several interesting fragments of λ Gtz may be obtained by placing restrictions on m. There is a m ≥ 1-fragment, which gives a version of the system λJ m studied in [8] . There is a m ≤ 1-fragment, which gives a version λ gs of the λg-calculus with explicit substitution λgs, to be defined in the next section. The m ≤ 1-terms are the terms normal w.r.t. the following permutation rule
µ . Clearly, ν is terminating and locally confluent. The ν-nf of t is written ν(t).
Natural deduction
The natural deduction system we introduce is named λ Nat (read "λ-natural"). It is an improvement of natural deduction with general elimination rules.
Natural deduction with general elimination rules: This system [20] may be presented as a type system for the λ-calculus with generalized application. The latter is the system ΛJ of [12] , which we rename here as λg, for the sake of uniformity with the names of other calculi. Terms of λg are given by M, N, P ::= x | λx.M | M (N, x.P ). The typing rule for generalized application is
The λg-calculus has two reduction rules:
Rule π corresponds to the permutative conversion allowed by general eliminations. The βπ-normal terms are given by M, N, P ::= x | λx.M | x(N, y.P ) and correspond to von Plato's "fully normal" natural deductions. A βπ-normal form M is called a Mints normal form if, for every application x(N, y.P ) in M , P is y-normal [4] . P is y-normal if P = y or P = y(N ′ , y ′ .P ′ ) and y / ∈ N ′ , P ′ and P ′ is y ′ -normal. Another characterisation of Mints nfs is as βπ-normal forms which are, in addition, normal w.r.t. a set of permutation rules given in [4] .
The λgs-calculus is the following version of λg with explicit substitution. A new term constructor, explicit substitution N/x M , is added. In rule β (β) (λx.M )(N, y.P ) → N/x M/y P , two explicit substitutions are generated, instead of two calls to the meta-substitution. π stays the same. Finally, the calculus contains a new reduction rule, named σ, and defined by N/x M → [N/x]M . A λgs-term is in βπσ-normal form iff it is a λg-term in βπ-normal form.
2
The usual λ-calculus embeds in λg by setting M N = M (N, x.x). Likewise, modus ponens (=Gentzen's elimination rule for implication) may be seen as the particular case of the gElim where B = C and the rightmost premiss is omitted. The set of β-normal λ-terms is in bijective correspondence with the set of Mints normal forms [14, 4] .
Motivation for λ Nat : If one sees generalised application M (N, x.P ) as a substitution subst(M N, x.P ) (the notation here is not important), then one can say that in λg every ordinary application M N occurs as the actual parameter of a substitution. This situation has a defect: it is cumbersome to write iterated, ordinary applications. 
There are two sorts of sequents in λ Nat , namely Γ ⊢ M : A and Γ ⊲ E : A. The typing system contains an assumption rule, an introduction rule, an elimination rule and a rule for typing substitution. These are standard, except for the use of two sorts of sequents. The coercion rule changes the kind of sequent. The displayed formula of the coercion rule is the coercion formula. The construction ap(E) (={E/x}x) represents the inverse of the coercion rule.
Reduction rules: The reduction rules of λ Nat will act on the head of substitutions {hd(M )N 1 ...N m /x}P . In order to have access to such heads, it is convenient to introduce the following syntactic expressions:
These expressions are called meta-contexts of λ Nat . As opposed to the contexts of λ Gtz , which are formal expressions of λ Gtz , meta-contexts are not formal expressions of λ Nat , but rather a device in the meta-language. Intuitively, a metacontext is a substitution with a "hole": {[]N 1 ...N k /x}P . Formally, given E, we define C[E] (the result of filling E in the hole of C) by recursion on C:
The reduction rules of λ Nat are as follows:
There are three reduction rules, β, π and σ, enforcing every head to be of the form hd(x) and to be in the function position of some application (hence not in the actual-parameter position of some substitution). The βπσ-normal forms are given by:
M, N, P ::= x | λx.M | {EN/x}P E ::= hd(x) | EN Later on, we will refer to this set as A . By normalisation we mean βπσ-reduction. At the level of derivations, the normality criterion is: a derivation in λ Nat is βπσ-normal if every coercion formula occurring in it is an assumption and the main premiss of an elimination. This extends von Plato's criterion of normality. Indeed, if m is always 1 in {hd(M )N 1 ...N m /x}P , coercion formula = main premiss of elimination, and the criterion boils down to: the main premiss of an elimination is an assumption.
The particular case P = x of rule σ reads ap(hd(M )) → M and is named ǫ. There is a fourth reduction rule, named µ, which is a handy tool not available in λg. Consider the λ-term xN 1 N 2 , that is, ap(hd(ap(hd(x)N 1 ))N 2 ). After a π step we get {hd(x)N 1 /z 1 }{hd(z 1 )N 2 /z 2 }z 2 (z i 's fresh), which is a βπσ-normal form, if N 1 , N 2 are. After a µ step one gets ap(hd(x)N 1 N 2 ), which is much simpler.
Related systems: A term M is βπσ-normal and only contains substitutions of the form ap(E) iff M is a normal term of Cervesato and Pfenning's coercion calculus in [1] . Later on, we will refer to the class of such terms as B . They are given by M, N ::= x | λx.M | ap(EN ) and E ::= hd(x) | EN . Another characterisation of this set is as the set of β-normal forms of λN , a coercion calculus studied in [5] .
Fragments 
The m ≤ 1-terms are the terms normal w.r.t. the following permutation rule
with z / ∈ N ′ , P . Notice that ν ⊆ µ −1 . Clearly, ν is terminating and locally confluent. The ν-nf of M is written ν(M ).
Isomorphism
Mappings Ψ and Θ: We start with a mapping Ψ : λ Nat − T erms −→ λ Gtz − T erms. Let Ψ (M ) = t, Ψ (N i ) = u i and Ψ (P ) = v. The idea is to map, say, {hd(M )N 1 N 2 N 3 /x}P to t(u 1 :: u 2 :: u 3 :: (x)v). This is achieved with the help of an auxiliary function Ψ ′ : λ Nat − EEs × λ Gtz − Contexts −→ λ Gtz − T erms as follows:
Next we consider a mapping Θ : λ Gtz − T erms −→ λ Nat − T erms. Let Θ(t) = M , Θ(u i ) = N i and Θ(v) = P . The idea is to map, say, t(u 1 :: u 2 :: u 3 :: (x)v) to {hd(M )N 1 N 2 N 3 /x}P . This is achieved with the help of an auxiliary function Θ ′ : λ Nat − EEs × λ Gtz − Contexts −→ λ Nat − T erms as follows:
Contexts vs meta-contexts: Let M etaContexts be the set of meta-contexts of λ Nat . It is obvious that there is a connection between contexts of λ Gtz and metacontexts of λ Nat . There is a function Θ : Contexts We can identify each meta-context C of λ Nat with a function of type EEs → Substs, where Substs is the set {M ∈ λ Nat : M is of the form {E/x}P }; it is the function that sends E to C[E] (hence C(E) = C[E]). Now let k be a context of λ Gtz and consider Θ ′ ( , k) : EEs → Substs. By induction on k one proves easily that Θ ′ ( , k) and Θ k are the same function, i.e.
Theorem 2 (Isomorphism). Mappings Ψ and Θ are sound, mutually inverse bijections between the set of λ Gtz -terms and the set of λ Nat -terms. Moreover, for each R ∈ {β, σ, π, µ}:
Proof: For bijection, prove ΘΨ M = M and ΘΨ ′ (E, k) = Θ ′ (E, k) by simultaneous induction on M and E, and prove Ψ Θt = t and Ψ Θ ′ (E, k) = Ψ ′ (E, k), by simultaneous induction on t and k. It follows that k = Ψ C iff C = Θ k . As to isomorphism, the "if" statements follow from the "only if" statements and bijection. We just sketch the "only if" statement 1, which is proved together with the claim that, if
The proof is by simultaneous induction on t → R t ′ and k → R k ′ , and uses the following properties of Θ:
Here are the base cases:
Case β.
Case σ: Θ( t/x v)
Corollary 1 (SN). Every typable t ∈ λ Nat is βπσµ-SN.
Proof: From Theorems 1 and 2.
Analyzing the isomorphism
Cut vs substitution, left introduction vs elimination, cut-elimination vs normalisation: There is an entanglement in the traditional mappings between natural deduction and sequent calculus. An elimination is translated as a combination of cut and left introduction [10] and a left introduction is translated as a combination of elimination and meta-substitution [18] . With these mappings one proves that normalisation is a "homomorphic" image of cut-elimination [22, 17] .
3
The typing system of λ Nat clarifies the puzzling relation between cut and substitution. Consider rule Cut in λ Gtz and rule Subst in λ Nat . First, we observe, as Negri and von Plato in [15] , that the right cut-formula of Cut, but not the right substitution formula in Subst, may be the conclusion of a sequence of left introductions. Second, and here comes the novelty, we may also observe that the left substitution formula in Subst, but not left cut-formula in Cut, may be the conclusion of a sequence of elimination rules. So, cut is more general on the right, whereas substitution is more general on the left.
Mapping Ψ establishes bijective correspondences between occurrences of elimination EN (resp. of substitution {E/x}P ) in the source term and occurrences of left introduction u :: k (resp. of cut tk) in the target term (inversely for Θ). So the entanglement of traditional mappings is solved, and the outcome is that normalization in λ Nat becomes the isomorphic image, under Θ, of cut-elimination in λ
Gtz .
Applicative terms: The presentation of sequent calculus and natural deduction as systems λ Gtz and λ Nat , respectively, reduces the difference between the two kinds of systems to the difference between two ways of organizing "applicative terms". By "applicative term" we mean the following data: a function (or head), m arguments (m ≥ 1) and a continuation (or tail). The notion of applicative term is intended as a common abstraction to the notions of cut in λ 
and substitution in λ Nat
When (2) and (3) are regarded in the abstract way of just providing the data that constitutes an applicative term, the only difference that remains between the two expressions is that (2) associates to the right, so that the head t is at the surface and the continuation (x)v is hidden at the bottom of the expression, whereas (3) associates to the left, so that the head hd(M ) is hidden at the bottom of the expression, and the continuation x, P is at the surface. The isomorphism λ Gtz ∼ = λ Nat may, then, be described as a mere inversion of the associativity of applicative terms.
Interpretations of λ Gtz : From the previous paragraph follows that an interpretation of λ Gtz is as a λ-calculus with right associative applicative terms. Another interpretation is as a formalized meta-calculus for λ Nat (and not for a smaller natural deduction system, like λg or λgs, let alone λ). Contexts in λ Gtz are the formal counterpart to meta-contexts in λ Nat and the interpretation of cut Θ(tk) = Θ k [hd(Θt)] is "fill Θt in the hole of Θ k ". 
--

Variants of the isomorphism: λ
Gtz ∼ = λ Nat is a particular manifestation of the isomorphism between sequent calculus and natural deduction. For instance, if rule π of λ Gtz is taken in the call-by-name version (tk)(u ::
, avoiding a critical pair with σ, then there is corresponding version for rule
Another variant of rule π is the "eager" variant, determined by a slight change in the definition of @: ((x)V )@k = (x)V k, if V is a value (i.e. variable or abstraction); and ((x)tk ′ )@k = (x)t(k ′ @k). So, one keeps pushing k until a value is found.
Let {Es/xs}P denote a sequence of substitutions {E 1 /x 1 }...{E n /x n }P . The eager variant of π for natural deduction is C[hd({Es/xs}V )] → {Es/xs}C[hd(V )]. So, the eager variant takes a sequence of substitutions out, as opposed to the lazy variant, which takes them one by one.
Theorem 2 still holds with eager π. In the proof fact (i) becomes slightly different: if
Particular cases of the isomorphism:
We now analyze the diagram in Figure 1 . The m ≤ 1-fragment λ gs of λ Gtz and the m ≤ 1-fragment λ gs of λ Nat are two copies of λgs, hence isomorphic. They are identified in Figure 1 . In both cases, the fragment consists of the ν-nfs. The isomorphism λ gs ∼ = λ gs is a degenerate form of Theorem 2, with Θ and Ψ translating between t(x)v and {hd(M )/x}P , and between t(u :: (x)v) and {hd(M )N/x}P . The latter are two decompositions of generalised elimination:
The λ-calculus is absent from Figure 1 (λ-terms form a subset of λgs), but there are three sets in bijective correspondence with the set of β-normal λ-terms, namely Herbelin nfs , B and Mints nfs , the lower triangle. Herbelin nfs ∼ = Mints nfs was known [4] , the bijection being the restriction of ν to Herbelin nfs . A degenerate form of Theorem 2 is Herbelin nfs ∼ = B . The latter bijection (but not the former) extends to another bijection, namely Schwichtenberg nfs ∼ = A (the former bijection does not extend to another bijection because many "multiary" cut-free derivations in Schwichtenberg nfs have the same ν-normal form in von Plato nfs ). The bijection Schwichtenberg nfs ∼ = A is in turn the residue of the isomorphism λ Gtz ∼ = λ Nat , because it is the bijection between the sets of βπσ-nfs. The dotted arrows represent three reduction relations generated by permutative conversions. Two of such relations have been characterised [4, 19] .
Final remarks
Contributions and related work: This paper completes Herbelin's programme, for the logic under analysis here. As compared to [11] , we covered full sequent calculus, where the constraints on left introduction that define Herbelin's fragment LJT are dropped, but where the phenomenon of permutative conversions, typical of sequent calculus, shows up. In addition, we fully achieved the second goal of Herbelin's programme, residually present in [11] , implicitly considered in [1] and already addressed in [5, 6] . The improvement over [1] and [5, 6] is that the spine calculus, when restricted to the logic of this paper, and the sequent systems in [5, 6] are all fragments of Herbelin's LJT and, therefore, are under the restrictions already mentioned.
In order to fully achieve the second goal, one has to define an extension of natural deduction that combines the idea of coercion calculus with von Plato's idea of generalised elimination rule [20] . On the one hand, von Plato's work goes much farther than this paper, in that [20] covers the whole language of first order logic; on the other hand, it lacks an analysis of the correspondence between cutelimination and normalisation, indispensable to attaining the second goal. This paper may then be seen as containing an extension of von Plato's work. Not only we extended and refined system λg (and here it is quite appealing that we end up in a system where generalised application is decomposed into modus ponens and substitution), but also we give the precise connection between generalised normalisation and cut-elimination, which is this: von Plato's normalisation, taken in the already slightly extended sense embodied in system λgs, is the common core of cut-elimination (in λ Gtz ) and normalisation (in λ Nat ) -in particular, it is a fragment of the former.
Once one has the natural deduction system λ Nat , one can clarify the connection between cut and substitution, and translate between sequent calculus and natural deduction in a way that the classical mappings of Gentzen [10] and Prawitz [18] never could: elimination and substitution correspond to left introduction and cut, respectively. At the term calculi level, this mapping inverts the associativity of applicative terms, as envisaged by Herbelin. Then, such bijection at the level of proofs proves to be an isomorphism between cut-elimination and normalisation. This result improves, for the logic examined here, the classical results of Zucker and Pottinger [22, 17] .
Applications and future work: An issue that deserves further consideration is the use of languages λ Gtz and λ Nat in practice. As emphasized in [1] , the spine calculus, Herbelin's λ and -we add -λ Gtz , give a useful representation of λ-terms for procedures that act on the head of applicative terms, like normalisation or unification. It seems that the role of languages like λ Gtz or λ Nat is not as languages in which someone writes his programs, but either as internal languages for symbolic systems, like theorem provers, or as intermediate languages for compilers of functional languages. On the other hand, languages λ Gtz and λ Nat are good tools for doing proof theory efficiently, as this paper shows. We plan to keep using these languages in a more comprehensive study of permutative conversions. As the study of rule ν shows so far, calculus λ Nat is no worse than calculus λ Gtz for that purpose.
Conclusions: Herbelin's seminal suggestion in [11] is that the (computational) difference between sequent calculus and natural deduction may be reduced to a mere question of representation of λ-terms, when these are conceived in a sufficiently extended sense. We proposed an abstract, robust extension of the concept of λ-term, under two concrete representations (λ Gtz -terms and λ Natterms), and studied the languages where these representations live. Representation questions (like whether there is direct head access in applicative terms) prove to have impact in the real word [1] . But, as expected, they also impact on foundational matters. Indeed, they allow a radical answer to a long-standing problem of structural proof-theory: if normalisation is extended as we propose, then the meaning of λ Gtz ∼ = λ Nat is that cut-elimination and normalisation are really the same process, they only look different because they operate with different representations of the same objects.
